Abstract. Forward guidance can be provided as an unconditional promise, i.e. commitment to a specific low policy rate. Alternatively, the promise may include an escape clause, i.e. a condition defining the state of the economy under which the central bank would not keep such a low rate and, instead, it would revert to setting policy under discretion. The escape clause can be expressed as a threshold in terms of a specific variable. The present paper shows that, when such a threshold is expressed in terms of an endogenous variable (e.g. output, inflation), there are cases where it becomes impossible for the central bank to act in a way that is consistent with its promise. Consistency imposes limits on the policy rate that can be set since reverting immediately to the optimal discretionary rate can be incompatible with exceeding the threshold.
INTRODUCTION
As an alternative way to respond to the recent global financial crisis, some major central banks committed to deliver a relatively low future policy rate. This strategy -usually referred to as Odyssean forward guidance (FG) -intends to provide stimulus to the economy through the expectations channel.
1 Such an unconventional policy, if credible, might be particularly useful when facing zero lower bound (ZLB) events, that is to say, situations where the monetary authority is not able to further reduce its conventional policy instrument, the short-term interest rate.
FG can be provided as an unconditional promise such that the policy rate will be kept low under any circumstance or, alternatively, the promise may include an escape clause, i.e. a condition defining the particular state of the economy under which the central bank would not deliver such a low rate and, instead, it 1. In practice, as remarked by Florez-Jimenez and Parra-Polania (2016) , it is difficult to characterise a specific FG policy as purely Odyssean since, when following a FG strategy, some central bank's actions seem to be more related to the purpose of making information clearer or revealing private information (Delphic FG). In some cases, the central bankers themselves have stated that their FG policies are not Odyssean.
determined before setting the policy rate. In contrast, I preserve the standard IS curve and formally analyse this specific problem. Using a standard three-equation New Keynesian model with fully forwardlooking (rational) expectations, complete information and fully credible central bank announcements, I provide 5 : (i) a proof of the aforementioned inconsistency and (ii) the conditions under which FG policies, with an endogenous threshold, can be implemented either by chance (given realisations of shocks, i.e. ex post) or by careful calibration of the policy rate that should be set when reverting to discretion (i.e. ex ante).
THE MODEL
To illustrate the problem of inconsistent announcements I use a standard threeequation New Keynesian model. The period loss function is
where p is inflation and y denotes the output gap. The Phillips curve and the IS curve, respectively, are
where E t is the expectations operator conditional on information available at time t, i t is the nominal interest rate, s t is the supply shock and e t is the demand shock. Both shocks follow independent autoregressive processes:
where t s;t and t e;t are white-noise disturbances. Under normal circumstances (i.e. when not facing ZLB episodes), the central bank follows a discretionary policy regime, and therefore, it does not precommit to a specific policy path. The central bank sets the policy rate path so as to minimise the expected value of the discounted loss:
Appendix A.1 solves this problem for the case in which there are no ZLB events. There is a lower bound for the nominal interest rate (i t ! i l ), and hence in rare but possible cases (when large negative shocks are realised), the central bank is not able to set i t at its optimal level i Ã t (see Equation (17) in Appendix A.1). I assume that, in period t, the interest-rate lower bound is reached (i t ¼ i l ). Like 5. The inconsistency here described might disappear in other setups. Notwithstanding, it stresses the fact that FG faces serious obstacles even under very favourable assumptions; other issues arise when relaxing them. The impact of FG depends crucially on credibility and forward-looking expectations. Assuming rationality is not innocuous either: under learning, for instance, the effectiveness of FG may be significantly reduced (Cole, 2016; Gust et al., 2018) . Boneva et al. (2018) , I assume that no more ZLB episodes are expected. 6 I also, for simplicity, assume that the ZLB event lasts only one period.
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Under discretion, the loss in period t is larger than the optimal one since the interest rate is different from the optimal rate (i t ¼ i l [ i Ã t ) and, as the economy recovers in t+1, L tþ1 would be at the optimum level. Alternatively, the central bank may reduce the loss in period t (through the expectations channel) by credibly committing to a relatively low value for the interest rate in t+1 (h tþ1 ), 8 i.e. the monetary authority may provide Odyssean FG. In doing so, the central bank mitigates the loss of period t by reducing monetary policy flexibility in t+1 (and therefore at the cost of increasing the expected loss of that period).
If there is a large positive demand shock or a large positive supply shock in period t+1, the central bank will face a high cost of delivering the announced low rate because there will be a significant deviation of such a rate from the optimal one. As a consequence, the central bank might find it useful to announce as well an escape clause, i.e. a condition under which it will not deliver the announced rate h tþ1 and will set the policy rate in a discretionary manner. In period t, when facing a ZLB event, the central bank announces h tþ1 , i.e. a specific value for the interest rate in t+1, together with a threshold-based condition: if the output gap in t+1 exceeds a threshold y h (i.e. y tþ1 ! y h ) 9 , rather than delivering the rate h tþ1 , the central bank sets the interest rate at the optimal discretionary level i Ã tþ1 (Equation (17), for period t+1). Before proceeding to formal analysis, it is important to remark that the crucial element that I am going to analyse is the coherence between the central bank announcement and the action taken. More specifically, when the threshold is exceeded the central bank should have indeed set, as announced, the optimal discretionary rate and, instead, when it is not exceeded, the announced low rate (h tþ1 ) should have been delivered. Since both the low rate and the threshold (y h ) are announced in period t (before the demand and the supply shocks of t+1 are known with certainty), it is important to distinguish between ex ante and ex post consistency. The latter requires coherence between the announcement (in t) and the action taken (in t+1), given the specific shocks realised in t+1. The former, a stronger condition, requires coherence between the announcement and the action taken, for any possible shock that may occur in t+1. Although ex post 6. See footnotes 10 and 13 for technical details on this assumption. 7. Removing this assumption does not eliminate the problem described in the present paper and actually further inconsistencies may arise: Boneva et al. (2018, Appendix B) allow for the occurrence of ZLB during several periods and show that promising to exit from the FG policy with certainty when the threshold is exceeded may be inconsistent: in some cases exit at time T implies insufficient stimulus for the threshold to be exceeded at that time but exit at time T+1 implies enough stimulus to exceed the threshold at an earlier date. The authors solve this problem by incorporating probabilistic exit, i.e. if the threshold is breached the lift-off probability becomes positive but less than one. 8. Like Florez-Jimenez and Parra-Polania (2016), but unlike the previous literature, I do not assume that the announced rate, h tþ1 , has to be equal to the lower bound (i l ). Florez-Jimenez and ParraPolania (2016) allow for the central bank to set h tþ1 optimally. Their results show that, even in very extreme ZLB episodes, the optimal rate h Ã tþ1 is well above the lower bound (and well below the optimal discretionary rate). 9. Details are shown for a threshold expressed in terms of the output gap; however, the case of a threshold in terms of inflation is analogous.
consistency is the one that agents observe (in t+1), ex ante consistency is essential: if it is not assured, there will be a positive probability of facing ex post inconsistency as the central bank cannot control the occurrence of shocks. This is why I mainly focus on analysing whether or not central bank announcements satisfy ex ante consistency.
Demand shocks only
Regarding the formal analysis, it is easier to start with the case in which there are demand shocks only (i.e. s t ¼ 0, ∀t). Supply shocks are included afterwards.
As no more ZLB events are expected 10 , from Appendix A.1 it is easy to see that, in the absence of supply shocks, i Ã tþ1 ¼ de tþ1 and y Ã tþ1 ¼ 0. Since this should occur when the threshold is breached, the consistency of the escape-clause announcement requires that y h 0.
If, instead, the threshold is not breached, the low rate h tþ1 applies and it should be the case that 11
and this condition implies that
, that is to say, consistency requires that when the rate h tþ1 is delivered, it should be higher than the optimal discretionary rate that would be set when facing the same shock e tþ1 .
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The abovementioned result illustrates the problem of inconsistent announcements (when only demand shocks occur): the central bank resorts to forward guidance to stimulate the economy, in t, by promising to keep the future policy rate lower than the one that would be expected under normal conditions; however, consistency requires the opposite, i.e. to promise a higher policy rate. In other words, to provide FG so as to stimulate the economy in t the central banks needs to make an inconsistent promise.
Demand and supply shocks
This subsection illustrates the problem of inconsistency when supply shocks are included.
If the output gap exceeds the threshold in period t+1 (i.e. y tþ1 ! y h ) the interest rate, according to the announcement, should be the optimal one under discretion. From Appendix A.1, the optimal interest rate and the output gap, respectively, are 10. To this purpose, I assume that the distribution of t e;tþi ∀i ≥ 1 is truncated such that the probability of t e;tþi \ i l =d À q e e tþiÀ1 is nil (and all agents in the model are fully aware of this fact). It implies that the expected value of t e;tþi may no longer be zero; however, this implication is innocuous as the central bank entirely offsets the potential effect of demand shocks on inflation and the output gap. 11. E tþ1 y tþ2 and E tþ1 p tþ2 are zero as no more ZLB events are expected and there are no supply shocks. 12. It is straightforward to see that the same happens with a threshold expressed in terms of inflation:
and 
Since no more ZLB events are expected 13 , from the results presented in Appendix A.1, it is easy to see that
and thus, after some algebra, condition (6) becomes
Notice that if the demand shock e tþ1 is large enough (such that condition (9) does not hold), the only consistent option is to deliver the optimal discretionary rate i Ã tþ1 . Therefore, if both the supply and demand shocks in t+1 are sufficiently large (such that s tþ1 [ s h tþ1 and (9) does not hold) there will be no equilibrium with a consistent announcement 14 : the threshold will not be exceeded when the central bank sets the optimal discretionary rate and, instead, it will be exceeded when the announced low rate is delivered. 15 13. To this purpose, I assume that the distribution of t e;tþi ∀i ≥ 1 is truncated such that the probability of t e;tþi \ i l =d À q e e tþiÀ1 À kd 1Àq s ð Þ þ kq s k 2 þk 1Àbq s ð Þ s tþi is nil (and all agents in the model are fully aware of this fact). One could alternatively truncate the distribution of t s;tþi but since it implies that the expected value of the shock could differ from zero, further changes should be taken into consideration, inter alia, some terms related to t s;tþ1 would be added to the solution in Appendix A.1. 14. The fact that both the supply and the demand shock have to be large enough is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for inconsistency. Notice that if kÀkd > 0, then the LHS of (9) 
If the supply shock satisfies s tþ1 \ s h tþ1 and the demand shock is sufficiently large, there will be no equilibrium with a consistent announcement.
Avoiding inconsistency
Consistency imposes limits on the policy rate that can be set since reverting immediately to the optimal discretionary rate can be incompatible with exceeding the threshold. The consistent option for the central bank is announcing that when the threshold is breached the policy rate will increase but may not be as high as the optimal discretionary rate. In that case, the policy rate should be within the set of the ones that do not make the announcement inconsistent (i.e. the set of policy rates that do not violate the condition y tþ1 ! y h ) and hence the central bank will set the rate according to
which may be well below the optimal discretionary rate (cf. (4)). Increasing the policy rate up to the optimal discretionary level might not provide sufficient stimulus for the threshold to be exceeded, and hence it may be an inconsistent option.
In practice, the escape clause has been activated once the corresponding variable has been realised (and observed), and therefore, the problem of inconsistent announcements described in this paper seems to be just a theoretical one. However, as can be easily deduced from the type of models considered in this paper, waiting to act only after the (endogenous) variable has been observed (and hence keeping the policy rate low during one more period) may imply a high cost due to the size of the deviation of the low policy rate from the optimal one. It would be good for the central bank to try to anticipate such a circumstance so as to minimise the length of situations in which the cost of keeping the low rate is significantly high. Nonetheless, it is also important to point out that this could imply announcing the threshold with respect to a variable forecast -rather than with respect to the variable itself. This possibility (i.e. expressing the threshold in terms of a forecast) might affect credibility, and hence it is not obvious that it improves the specification of state-dependent FG.
CONCLUSION
Using a standard three-equation New Keynesian model with rational and fully forward-looking expectations, complete information and fully credible central bank announcements, the present paper shows that when the threshold (in state-dependent forward guidance) is expressed in terms of an endogenous variable, an inconsistency may arise since it may be impossible for the central bank to act according to its promise. The central bank announces that it will revert to the optimal discretionary rate if the threshold is breached; however, for some cases, the endogenous variable would not exceed the threshold if the central bank set the optimal discretionary rate and it would exceed the threshold if the 16. Equations (3), ( 7) and (8) have been taken into account so as to obtain this condition. For consistency, it is required that y tþ1 ! y h . When the central bank cannot increase the policy rate up to the optimal level, it sets the highest possible rate that satisfies consistency, and hence y tþ1 ¼ y h (since @y tþ1 =@i tþ1 \ 0).
central bank kept the policy rate low. To avoid this inconsistency, the monetary policymaker has to announce that if the threshold is breached the policy rate will increase but may not be as high as the optimal discretionary rate.
APPENDIX A
A.1 Solution for the model with persistent shocks, in the absence of ZLB events
